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ABSTRACT
Critical infrastructures remain vulnerable to cyber attack despite a raft of
post-9/l] legislation focused on cyber security in critical infrastructures.
An emerging discipline known as the "economics of information security"
may provide a partial solution in the form of a hypothetical market that
trades "exploit derivatives, " a modified futures contract tied to cyber
security events. This paper argues that such a market could serve to predict
and prevent cyber attacks through the operation of the efficient capital
market hypothesis, but only after changes to the present regulatory
environment. Specifically, I argue that a statutory safe harbor would allow
the creation of a pilot market focused on vulnerabilities in Internet protocol
version six, an emerging communications standard that China hopes to
deploy throughout its national network before the 2008 Olympics. Indeed,
such a safe harbor would align the interests of military and civilian
policymakers on the common goal of protecting critical infrastructure from
a computer network attack originating in China, whether instigating by the
People's Liberation Army or so-called "black-hat" hackers.
* J.D., University of Colorado, 2007; LL.M. candidate, Peking University, 2009. The
author served as Editor-in-Chief of the Journal on Telecommunications & High
Technology Law and as communications director of the Silicon Flatirons Program. This
article benefited from the comments of Gabriel Rosenberg and Chris Riley, as well as the
help of Professors Paul Ohm, Scott Peppet, Doug Sicker, and Philip J. Weiser, but above
all else from the advice and support of Katie Roenbaugh Schwalb.
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INTRODUCTION
September 1 1th inspired a host of regulations and government
entities focused on what the Pentagon calls "computer network operations,"
or CNO.I The USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 created the National
Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center at Sandia National
Laboratories to model large-scale cyber attacks on "critical infrastructure.
'" 2
A year later, Congress passed the Cyber Security Research and
Development Act' ("CSRDA") to fund "computer and network security
research and development." 4 Two weeks after CSRDA went into effect, the
President signed the Homeland Security Act of 2002, creating the
Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") and its Directorate for
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection. 5  The Federal
Information Security Management Act of 2002 ("FISMA") in turn
established a statutory regime for protecting information systems in civilian
federal agencies. 6 Following the release of the National Strategy to Secure
Cyberspace,7 DHS and Carnegie Mellon partnered to form the United States
Computer Emergency Readiness Team ("US-CERT"), a center that
"analyzes incidents reported by federal civilian agencies and coordinates
with national security incident response centers in responding to incidents
on both classified and unclassified systems." 8 Given such an abundance of
legislation, a political novice might believe that Congress solved all of
America's cyber security problems.
It seems, however, that the road to lackluster critical infrastructure
protection is paved with regulation. Despite FISMA, malicious software
1See generally JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT DOCTRINE FOR INFORMATION
OPERATIONS GL-6 (2006), available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/newpubs/
jp3_13.pdf (describing CNO as "[c]omprised of computer network attack, computer
network defense, and related computer network exploitation enabling operations"). "CNO
... is used to attack, deceive, degrade, disrupt, deny, exploit, and defend electronic
information and infrastructure." Id. at 11-4 to -5.
2 Critical Infrastructures Protection Act of 2001 § 1016(d), 42 U.S.C. § 5195 (2006).
Notably, the Act defined "critical infrastructure" as "systems and assets, whether physical
or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems
and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security,
national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters." Id. at § 1016(e).
3Cyber Security Research and Development Act, Pub. L. No. 107-305, 116 Stat. 2367
(2002) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
4 Id.
5 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
6 Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002, 44 U.S.C.A. §§ 3541-49
(2002).
7 THE WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL STRATEGY TO SECURE CYBERSPACE (2003),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/pcipb/cyberspacestrategy.pdf.
8 U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, INFORMATION SECURITY: EMERGING
CYBERSECURITY ISSUES THREATEN FEDERAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS 16 (2005), available
at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05231 .pdf [hereinafter GAO INFOSEC REPORT].
2006-2007
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("malware") 9 "continues to threaten the secure operation of federal
information systems" due to the increasing sophistication of cyber attacks
and inadequate protection of network security software.' 0 A sustained
computer network attack originating in China continues to target the United
States government's information systems with almost seven years of
unabated activity and little means of defense. 1' A 2002 war game on critical
infrastructure revealed that the most vulnerable infrastructure components
were the Internet itself and the computer systems that underpin the financial
sector. 12 And even though DHS created US-CERT to provide better
information about computer network attacks in the hopes of reducing
vulnerabilities, international, federal, and state laws inhibit reporting.
Indeed, one can argue that critical infrastructure remains vulnerable largely
because of the reulations and government bodies created to enhance our
national security.
Economists would describe the present vulnerabilities as a market
failure because the market failed to produce "all the gains that [could] be
achieved through trade."'15 Classic welfare economics suggests that the
9 "Malware (malicious software) is defined as programs that are designed to carry out
annoying or harmful actions. They often masquerade as useful programs or are embedded
into useful programs so that users are induced into activating them. Malware can include
viruses, worms, and spyware." Id. at 5 n.3.
'0Id. at 37-39 (describing polymorphic, metamorphic, and entry-point-obscuring
viruses, as well as bots), 44-50.
11 See JAMES A. LEWIS, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT'L STUDIES - TECH. & PUB. POL'Y
PROGRAM, COMPUTER ESPIONAGE, TITAN RAIN AND CHINA 2 (2005), available at
http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/051214 china titan rain.pdf; Siobhan Gorman,
Hacker Attacks Hitting Pentagon, BALT. SUN, July 2, 2006, at Al (noting that Chinese
hackers penetrated and stole data from a classified system used by the Joint Chiefs of
Staff); Bradley Graham, Hackers Attack U.S. Via Chinese Websites, WASH. POST, Aug. 25,
2005, at Al; Alan Sipress, Computer System Under Attack, WASH. POST, Oct. 6, 2006, at
A21 (noting a cyber attack on the Department of Commerce that obtained information
about domestic products subject to export controls); Nathan Thornburgh, The Invasion of
the Chinese Cyberspies (And the Man Who Tried to Stop Them), TIME, Sept. 5, 2005, at 34.
12 See CLAY WILSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., COMPUTER ATTACK AND
CYBERTERRORISM: VULNERABILITIES AND POLICY ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 8 (2005),
available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL32114.pdf.
13 See NAT'L INFRASTRUCTURE ADVISORY COUNCIL, VULNERABILITY DISCLOSURE
FRAMEWORK: FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE COUNCIL 38 (2004),
available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/vdwgreport.pdf (noting the need for a
regulatory review of federal civil and criminal laws governing cyber security).
14See GAO INFOSEC REPORT, supra note 8, at 41 ("Many agencies have not fully
addressed the risks of emerging cybersecurity threats as part of their agencywide
information security programs, which include FISMA-required elements such as
performing periodic assessments of risk; implementing security controls commensurate
with the identified risk; ensuring security awareness training for agency personnel; and
implementing procedures for detecting, reporting, and responding to security incidents.").
15 Richard 0. Zerbe & Howard McCurdy, The End of Market Failure, 23 REGULATION
10, 11 (2000) (suggesting that market failures are not a precondition to regulation, but
rather that market failures arise out of transaction costs which can include regulation); see
also L. Jean Camp & Catherine D. Wolfram, Pricing Security, in ECONOMICS OF
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government can correct the failure either through further regulation or by
relaxing regulations to promote cyber security through market
mechanisms. 6 As shown above, however, additional regulation often fails
or may even worsen a market failure, particularly in an area like cyber
security that may pose prohibitively high costs for the regulator. 17 Markets,
on the other hand, can eliminate market failures "with mechanisms that
eventually feedback [sic] and thus mitigate the problems at their source."'
18
Indeed, the "economics of information security," as an emerging academic
discipline, may even provide a paradigm for curing civilian cyber security
deficiencies.
19
This paper draws upon studies of the economics of information
security to argue that a "vulnerability market" will better harden civilian
computer systems against cyber security threats than continued regulation.
(As a point of clarification, I should note that I employ the term civilian
computer systems in reference to mass-produced technologies used both
within and without the military, and not to custom-built systems procured
specifically for defense purposes.) Part I examines security vulnerabilities
as a negative externality to illuminate the problems facing policymakers,
and shows how policymakers can learn from the Pentagon's response. Part
II explains how a market solution would help companies internalize those
negative externalities by reducing transaction costs and motivating cyber
security stakeholders. Part III acknowledges that inconsistent legal regimes
may pose an insurmountable barrier to the creation of the described market,
because present protections for critical infrastructure revolve around
maintaining the secrecy of vulnerabilities. Part IV shows how an
experimental safe harbor focused on Internet protocol version six could
align the interests of military and civilian policymakers on the common goal
of protecting critical infrastructure from a computer network attack
originating in the People's Republic of China.
I. SECURITY VULNERABILITIES ARE NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES
The following four sections examine software vulnerabilities
through an economic lens, showing that (A) security problems are negative
externalities, (B) the Pentagon manages to internalize those externalities,
INFORMATION SECURITY 17, 21-22 (L. Jean Camp & Stephen Lewis eds., 2004) (noting
market failures in cybersecurity).
16 See Rainer Bhme, Vulnerability Markets: What is the Economic Value of a Zero-
Day Exploit? 2 (Proceedings of 22C3, Dec. 2005), available at http://www.inf.tu-
dresden.de/-rb2 /publications/Boehme2005 22C3 VulnerabilityMarkets.pdf.
17 See Joel P. Trachtman, Global Cyberterrorism, Jurisdiction, and International
Organization, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF CYBERSECURITY 259, 274 (Mark F. Grady
& Francesco Parisi eds., 2006) (contending that the international nature of cyberspace may
render national regulatory action prohibitively costly).
18 Bohme, supra note 16, at 2.
19 See generally L. Jean Camp, The State of Economics of Information Security, 2 I/S:
J.L. & POL'Y 189, 193 (2006); Bhme, supra note 16, at 4-5 (noting the advantages of
exploit derivatives as a timely indicator of vulnerabilities with low transaction costs).
2006-2007
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(C) transaction costs perpetuate those externalities outside of the
"traditional" defense setting, and (D) the military in particular bears some
responsibility for continued transaction costs.
A. THE IDEAL MARKET
Understanding software vulnerabilities requires understanding
externalities. Assume a cattle rancher owns a steer that will yield $1000 in
meat if that steer only eats corn available on the rancher's unbounded
pasture. The adjacent landowner, a hunting guide, earns $1000 a year in
fees from weekend warriors that hunt pheasant, quail, and turkeys in the tall
native grasses on the guide's land. It turns out, however, not only that the
rancher and the guide know each other and get along, but also that cows
love to eat tall native grasses and shrubs, and that grass and shrubs reduce
cattle yields. 20 It also turns out that the wild birds thrive in tall native
grasses, such that the steer's grass consumption reduces the quantity of
birds available for hunting, and the guide's hunting revenue. As such, by
virtue of the steer entering the hunting ground, the rancher's yield will drop
to $800, and the guide's fees will drop to $800 as well. Without a trespass
liability regime, however, Nobel Prize-winning work by Ronald Coase
suggests that the rancher and the guide will split the cost of a $198 fence
that keeps the steer from eating the grass. That is, with perfect information
and no impediments to contract formation, the two parties will bargain for a
total yield of $1802 instead of settling for $1600, internalize the
externalities posed by the steer, and increase their total welfare.
Externalities assume both positive and negative forms.
Telecommunications networks like the Internet, for example, exhibit
positive externalities in that "the value of a network to any given user is
directly proportional to the number of other users who can be reached on
it.' ' 21 Indeed, "the simple act of installing telephone service to an additional
customer creates positive externalities on everyone on the telephone
network because they can use the telephone to reach one additional
person." 22 But if machinery in a candy factory disturbs patients in an
adjacent medical practice, or a brewery expels pollution into a well shared
by a surrounding community, then the factory noise and the well pollution
constitute negative externalities.23 Absent transaction costs, the Coase
Theorem suggests that the Internet provider, the Internet user, the
confectioner, the doctor, the brewer, and the neighbors of the brewer will all
bargain to internalize the positive and negative externalities.
24
The relationship between producers of custom-built defense
software and the Pentagon approximates this result. Suppose, for example,
20 Michael Pollan, Power Steer, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 31, 2002, at 44, available at
http://online.redwoods.edu/instruct/TOlsen/Math/%2015/Pollan2.pdf.
21 JONATHAN E. NUECHTERLEIN & PHILIP J. WEISER, DIGITAL CROSSROADS 333 (2005).
22 See Camp & Wolfram, supra note 15, at 19.
23 See, e.g., R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & EcoN. 1 (1960).
24 See id. at 5-6 (offering a cattle-raising hypothetical to illustrate the general theorem).
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that the world's most advanced military needs to buy software from
25company A. The software package contains several vulnerabilities that
will expose classified military information and thereby undermine national
security, while reports of the exposures will depress the value of company
A's publicly traded stock. Absent transaction costs, the military and
company A will finance a testing facility that finds and fixes the
vulnerabilities, 26 such that the classified information remains secure and the
vulnerabilities remain hidden from the public eye. In other words, the
military and company A will internalize the externality such that the
"pricing system . . . account[s] for all the costs and benefits from trade"
between the parties. 2 7 The pricing of commercial off-the-shelf ("COTS")
software and hardware, on the other hand, largely ignores the possibility
and extent of vulnerability damages.
28
B. EXISTING TRANSACTION COSTS
Vulnerabilities in COTS software remain and impact critical
infrastructure because high transaction costs inhibit Coasian bargains.
Indeed, had he written The Problem of Social Cost thirty years later, one
can imagine Coase using security vulnerabilities in place of pollution or29
factory noise. The solution posed by Coase applies with equal vigor to
vulnerabilities in COTS systems, in that lowering transaction costs would
allow producers and consumers to bargain for efficient outcomes. In the
present environment, however, producers can avoid the monitoring costs
they would otherwise incur identifying vulnerabilities, and the number of
customers prevents efficient bargaining.3 0 Above all, however, notions of
secrecy in national security and software development pose the largest
challenge to internalizing the externality; "security by obscurity" poses the
most insurmountable transaction cost.
Monitoring costs arise because new software inevitably entails new
bugs.3' Indeed, "[s]ome level of software failure will always be with us.",
32
25 See Premkumar T. Devanbu & Stuart Stubblebine, Software Engineering for
Security: A Roadmap 234 (Proceedings of the Conference on The Future of Software
Eng'g, 2000), available at http://portal.acm.org/citation.cfm?id-336559&coll-portal
&dl-ACM (noting that "[t]he U.S. government has been forced to move towards using
[commercial-off-the-shelf software] to meet cost, quality and schedule constraints").
2 6 DEP'T OF DEF., INSTRUCTION: INFORMATION ASSURANCE (IA) IMPLEMENTATION 34
(2003), available at http://niap.bahialab.com/cc-scheme/policy/dod/d85002p.pdf (requiring
Common Criteria certification from the National Information Assurance Partnership for all
military IT).
27 Zerbe & McCurdy, supra note 15, at 11.
28 See Camp & Wolfram, supra note 15, at 17.
29 Coase, supra note 23, at 8.
30 See Joseph Stiglitz, The Private Uses of Public Interests: Incentives and Institutions,
12 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 11 (1998) (describing impediments to coalition forming and
bargaining).
31 Compare Zerbe & McCurdy, supra note 15, at 14 (describing how failure to monitor
can cause inefficiencies), with Ross Anderson, Security in Open Versus Closed Systems
2006-2007
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But fixing bugs and protecting systems yields little direct return on
investment, impedes time to market, and oftentimes undermines system
usability; thus, manufacturers understandably sacrifice cost-incurring
security for value-added functionality.3 3 Moreover, vulnerabilities also
involve somewhat of a statistical battle between software producers and
malevolent hackers: A vendor must identify and fix thousands of bugs,
whereas a computer attacker must only identify a single exploit to bring
down an information system, let alone an entire network.34 In the present
environment, however, producers of COTS software rarely suffer the
consequences of vulnerabilities and therefore lack the incentive to cure
defects. 35 As a result, COTS software producers seek to avoid monitoring
vulnerabilities either through legislation or licensing agreements, and
thereby shift the vulnerabilities downstream.
36
Though the Pentagon can bargain with software producers to
internalize the externality, the number of purchasers involved in COTS
software renders coordination of different licensing agreements largely
impossible. 37 Indeed, imagine every adult in the United States trying to
convince Microsoft to accept liability for vulnerabilities in Internet
Explorer, a bargain that would involve a contract between Microsoft and
approximately 126 million adult consumers. 8 For widespread COTS
The Dance of Boltzman, Coase and Moore 3 (June 18, 2002) (unpublished manuscript),
http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/-rjal4/Papers/toulouse.pdf ("The failure time observed by a tester
depends only on the initial quality of the code ... and the time spent testing it so far.").
32 Robert N. Charette, Why Software Fails, IEEE SPECTRUM ONLINE, Sept. 2005,
http://www.spectrum.ieee.org/sep05/1685/2.
33 Myriam Dunn, International Telecommunications Union, A Comparative Analysis of
Cybersecurily Initiatives Worldwide 6 (WSIS Thematic Meeting on Cybersecurity, 2005),
available at http://www.itu.int/osg/spu/cybersecurity/docs/Background Paper
Comparative Analysis Cybersecurity Initiatives Worldwide.pdf.
34 Ross Anderson, Open and Closed Systems are Equivalent (That Is, in an Ideal
World), in PERSPECTIVES ON FREE AND OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE 127, 139 (Joseph Feller
et al. eds., 2005), available at http://mitpress.mit.edu/books/chapters/
0262062461chap8.pdf; WILSON, supra note 12, at 9 (describing how a flaw discovered in
2002 would even have allowed attackers to "take over Internet routers and cripple network
telecommunications equipment globally").
35 See Ross Anderson, Why Information Security is Hard An Economic Perspective 1
(2001) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/-rjal4/Papers/econ.pdf.
36 See Sherwin Rosen, Transaction Costs and Internal Labor Markets, in THE NATURE
OF THE FIRM: ORIGINS, EVOLUTION, AND DEVELOPMENT 75, 82 (Oliver E. Williamson &
Sidney G. Winter eds., 1993).
31 Cf Zerbe & McCurdy, supra note 15, at 11 ("In essence, externalities exist because
the transaction costs of resolving them are too high.").
38 Estimates as of April 2006 put the number of online adults in the United States at 147
million, MARY MADDEN, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, INTERNET PENETRATION
AND IMPACT 3 (2006), http://www.pewintemet.org/pdfs/PIP Internet lmpact.pdf, and
estimates as of June 2006 indicate that 86% of Internet users in the United States use
Microsoft's Internet Explorer, Press Release, WebSideStory, Germany Records Highest
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products in particular, the coordination costs are enormous.
But monitoring and coordination costs pale in comparison to the
transaction costs involved in secrecy. Indeed, a perverse incentive arises in
that burying vulnerability information allows COTS producers to avoid the
costs of correction and maintain goodwill. For publicly traded companies,
failure to disclose security breaches can even prevent negative market
corrections. 39 For the military, however, an even greater distortion emerges,
in that the military actor lucky enough to discover a vulnerability can
choose between remaining quiet and later exploiting the bug in wartime or
disclosing the vulnerability, losing the value of the exploit, and incurring
the cost of correction in military systems. 40 Indeed, because discovery and
disclosure of vulnerabilities tends to increase their use,4 1 cyber security
prizes "security by obscurity" with good reason.42
C. THE MILITARY AS THE FIRM: THE PENTAGON'S EXTERNALITY
SOLUTION
Indeed, it appears that while developing internal software security
capabilities enhances the welfare of the military, transaction costs for the
private sector may increase. As indicated above, cyber security at the
Pentagon reduces the transaction costs described above and internalizes the
externalities, thereby providing a more efficient outcome. 43 When efficient
to do so, the Pentagon procures information systems that receive a
certification under "Common Criteria" testing, a process used to expose
vulnerabilities in outsourced software that narrows the field of vendors to
those willing to undergo the expense of fixing bugs. 44 For military
operations, however, the costs of outsourcing cyber security, and even cyber
attack, far exceed the cost of bringing the capabilities in-house. 4 5 As such,
one can view CNO-computer network enabling operations, computer
39 See generally Katherine Campbell et al., The Economic Cost of Publicly Announced
Information Security Breaches: Empirical Evidence from the Stock Market, I 1 J.
COMPUTER SECURITY 431 (2003) (describing negative stock price reactions when
vulnerabilities are disclosed).
40 See Anderson, supra note 35, at 5.
41 Camp, supra note 19, at 194.
42 See Auguste Kerckhoffs, La Cryptographie Militaire, 3 JOURNAL DES SCIENCES
MILITAIRES 5, 12 (1883), available at http://www.petitcolas.net/fabien/kerclhoffs/
crypto militaire_l.pdf.
4, Cf Amitai Aviram, Network Responses to Network Threats: The Evolution into
Private Cybersecurity Associations, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF CYBERSECURITY,
supra note 17, at 143, 161-63.44 See WILSON, supra note 12, at 30. Notably, most civilian agencies do not subject
software purchases to similar testing.
45 See Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, in THE NATURE OF THE FIRM: ORIGINS,
EVOLUTION, AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 36, at 18, 21 (1993) ("A firm is likely
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network attacks, and computer network defense 46-as a Coasian firm4 7 that
minimizes the transaction costs the Pentagon would otherwise incur by
outsourcing cyber security.
Indeed, CNO serves to validate Coase's notion that firms emerge as
a business structure when bringing a needed skill in-house reduces the
transaction costs an entity would otherwise experience through arms-length
bargaining. 48 With CNO, instead of relying upon outside parties the military
internalizes computer network enabling operations ("CNE"), hiring agents
to build systems in-house to conduct digital reconnaissance-gathering data
from target information systems for intelligence purposes and to plan future
computer network attacks.49 With computer network attack ("CNA"), the
Pentagon relies upon trained technicians to exploit vulnerabilities in
programs, protocols, or passwords discovered after CNE, using malware "as
a weapon to infect enemy computers to exploit a weakness in software, in
the system configuration, or in the computer security practices of an
organization or computer user." 50  With computer network defense
("CND"), however, in-house talent at the National Security Agency
("NSA") may be able to prevent CNE and CNA by using firewalls,
intrusion detection systems, and configuration management, among other
technical mechanisms, on a national scale. 51 Therefore, by bringing CNO in
house, the military therefore minimizes the transaction costs involved in
bargaining with independent contractors capable of performing such work,
predicting CNO needs in wartime, and revealing secret vulnerability
information to outside parties.
52
In doing so, however, both the military and Congress ignore the fact
that national security "no longer refers merely to the conduct of wars among
nations, but rather to the protection of American citizens, interests and
property from outside threats of any kind., 53 Indeed, the secrecy
surrounding vulnerabilities simultaneously operates as an impediment (read:
46 See JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, supra note 1; supra note 1 and accompanying text.
47 See Coase, supra note 23, at 17 (describing the government as a super-firm).
48 See Coase, supra note 45, at 22.
49 See JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, supra note 1, at 11-5 to -7 (discussing CNE); WILSON,
supra note 12, at 5, 36-37 (describing how hackers opportunistically scan the Internet
looking for poorly configured computers, networks, or routers).
50 WILSON, supra note 12, at 3.
51 See Ross ANDERSON, SECURITY ENGINEERING 388-89 (2001), available at
http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/-rjal4/book.html ("But there is some hope that firewalls can keep
out the worst of the attacks, that careful configuration management can block most of the
rest, and that intrusion detection can catch most of the residue that make it through.").
52 Cf ANDERSON, supra note 51, at 369 ("There are a few organizations, such as
computer companies, major universities, and military intelligence agencies, that have
people who know how to track what's going on and tune the defenses appropriately.");
Coase, supra note 45, at 21 ("The main reason why it is profitable to establish a firm would
seem to be that there is a cost of using the price mechanism.").
53 C'tr for the Study of Tech. & Soc'y, Why Study National Security?,
http: /web.archive.org/web/2 0 060425 18 10 52/http: //tecsoc. org/natsec/whatsnatsec.htm (last
visited Apr. 14, 2007).
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transaction cost) to internalizing the externality, and as an input to
producing a "public good."
D. SECRECY AS A TRANSACTION COST AND A REGULATION
Economists generally treat national security as a public good
requiring regulation, primarily through taxes and statutes, for production.
5 4
Sovereigns rely upon regulation because pure public goods are non-
excludable and non-rivalrous-one party's consumption of the good does
not reduce the amount available for others.55 Chlorofluorocarbon ("CFC")
production, for instance, thins the ozone layer and increases global levels of
ultraviolet radiation.56 But one nation may not exclude another from the
benefits of a thickened ozone layer, and one nation will not compete with
another for reduced ultraviolet radiation, so the benefits of reducing CFC
production become purely public.5 7 As such, public goods also present
certain incentive challenges.
Public goods lead to "Tragedies of the Commons" because parties
can easily free-ride.5 8 Philosopher David Hume described the difficulty as
follows:
Two neighbors may agree to drain a meadow, which they possess
in common; because 'tis easy to them to know each other's mind;
and each must perceive that the immediate consequence of his
failing in his part, is, the abandoning of the whole project. But 'tis
very difficult, and indeed impossible, that a thousand persons
shou'd agree in any such action; it being difficult for them to
concert so complicated a design, and still more difficult for them to
execute it; while each seeks a pretext to free himself of the trouble
and experience, and wou'd lay the whole burden on others.
Political society easily remedies both these inconveniences.59
Governments therefore seek to provide public goods through regulation and
not market solutions because markets fail to eliminate the Tragedy.6" For
this reason, the United States generally seeks to bolster national security
54 See RICHARD CORNES & TODD SANDLER, THE THEORY OF EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC
GOODS, AND CLUB GOODS 4 (2d ed. 2003); Cf TODD SANDLER & KEITH HARTLEY, THE
ECONOMICS OF DEFENSE 58 (1995).
55 See, e.g., MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965) (considering
collective consumption and the impact of externalities on group behavior).
56 James Murdoch & Todd Sandier, The Voluntary Provision of a Pure Public Good:
The Case of Reduced CFC Emissions and the Montreal Protocol, 63 J. OF PUB. ECON. 331,
332 (1997).
57Id.
58 ERIC VON HIPPEL, DEMOCRATIZING INNOVATION 89 (2005).
59 DAVID HUME, TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 590 (Penguin Books 1986) (1739)
(emphasis added).
60 Camp & Wolfram, supra note 15, at 21.
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through legislation, particularly when it comes to cyber security.
61
With cyber security, however, regulating "security by obscurity"
devolves national security into an impure public good with exclusionary
and rivalrous attributes.62  Indeed, in its attempts to secure critical
infrastructure, the United States applies lower security standards for
information technology in civilian settings63 and heightened security
standards in military applications. 64 As a practical matter, it only makes
sense that military systems include better security measures. As an
economic matter, however, the regulated double standard simultaneously
produces national security as a public good for the military and perpetuates
insecurity for critical infrastructure by creating a transaction cost that
perpetuates the negative externality. A market-based solution that actually
inhibits secrecy might yield better results by better aligning producer
incentives with national interests.
66
Civilian cyber security must therefore learn from and extend the
military's ability to reduce transaction costs in a manner that strikes the
balance between internalizing the externality and producing the public
good. That is, if negative externalities persist in the civilian environment
because the transaction costs of resolving them remain too high, then a
mechanism must arise that provides incentives for more efficient
bargaining. The emerging study of "economics of information security"
provides an ideal means for bringing about this result through a market-
based solution, one that aligns the incentives of both the military and
civilian users through fungible instruments traded on "vulnerability
markets."
68
61 See supra Introduction.
62 See CORNES & SANDLER, supra note 54, at 4.
63 "The purposes of this subchapter are to ... (5) acknowledge that commercially
developed information security products offer advanced, dynamic, robust, and effective
information security solutions, reflecting market solutions for the protection of critical
information infrastructures important to the national defense and economic security of the
nation that are designed, built, and operated by the private sector. . . ." 44 U.S.C.A. § 3541
(2007).64 Nat'l Sec Agency, Fact Sheet, NSTISSP No. 11, Revised Fact Sheet National
Information Assurance Acquisition Policy (July 2003), http://www.cnss.gov/Assets/pdf/
nstissp_l l_fs.pdf. See also DEP'T OF DEF., INFORMATION ASSURANCE (IA), DIRECTIVE
8500.1, at 3 (2002), http://www.biometrics.dod.mil/documents/InformationAssuarance/
DoDD85001.pdf.
65 ANDERSON, supra note 51, at 3-4 ("Security requirements differ greatly from one
system to another. One typically needs some combination of user authentication,
transaction integrity and accountability, fault-tolerance, message secrecy, and covertness.
But many systems fail because their designers protect the wrong things, or protect the right
things but in the wrong way.").
66 See Camp & Wolfram, supra note 15, at 18 (discussing a private market for security
vulnerabilities and its ability to make software producers internalize security externalities).
61 Cf Zerbe & McCurdy, supra note 15, at 11.
68 Camp, supra note 19, at 189.
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II. VULNERABILITY MARKETS LOWER TRANSACTION COSTS
In a limited sense, vulnerability markets already exist and operate to
enhance national security, or at least to defer the cost of attacks.69 Lloyds of
London, for instance, offered its first information security insurance policy
in 2003.70 In 2006, Microsoft purchased a vulnerability found in its
Windows Metafile System for $4,000 and published a patch for the
vulnerability outside of its regularly-scheduled monthly security update.
71
Some security companies even hold contests where hackers can win cash
prizes for discovering vulnerabilities, sometimes with embarrassing results
for the company holding the contest. 72 Recent scholarship also notes the
emergence of a black market operating between hackers and criminals that
trades vulnerabilities leading to valuable confidential information.73 Of
these markets, however, only one type tends to yield socially optimal
results: an exploit derivatives market.' 4 Understanding the benefits of an
exploit derivatives market, however, requires a brief detour through other
structures.75
A. BUG CHALLENGES
The least efficient vulnerability market involves bug challenges,
whereby a vendor allocates monetary rewards for vulnerability reports
69 Id. at 189-90 (noting the purchase of a zero-day exploit by 3Com from an anonymous
hacker in 2005); see also Brad Stone, A Lively Market, Legal and Not, for Software Bugs,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2007, at A l (discussing sales of software vulnerabilities by hackers to
companies including Apple, Oracle, and Microsoft).
70 Camp, supra note 19, at 192.
71 See, e.g., LAURA KOETZLE, FORRESTER RESEARCH, HANDLING ZERO-DAY EXPLOITS
1 (2006), available at http://www.forrester.com/Research/Document/Excerpt/
0,7211,39132,00.html; Mind Streams of Information Security Knowledge,
http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2006/05/microsoft-in-information-security.html (May 30,
2006).
72 John Leyden, Hacking Contest Publicity Stunt Backfires, REGISTER, Apr. 25, 2001,
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2001/04/25/hackingcontestpublicitystunt backfires.
71 See Jaziar Radianti & Jose J. Gonzalez, Toward a Dynamic Modeling of the
Vulnerability Black Market 2-3 (Oct. 26, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author), available at http://wesii.econinfosec.org/draft.php?paper id-44.
74 See Rainer Bohme, A Comparison of Market Approaches to Software Vulnerability
Disclosure, in EMERGING TRENDS IN INFORMATION AND COMPUTER SECURITY, 298, 308
tbl.2 (2006), available at http://www.springerlink.com/content/428k87mr2h103143/
fulltext.pdf [hereinafter Boihme Market Comparison]. But see Andy Ozment, Bug
Auctions: Vulnerability Markets Reconsidered 17-20 (Third Workshop on Econ. & Info.
Security, 2004) http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/-jo262/papers/weisO4-ozment-bugauc.pdf (listing
problems with the vulnerability market of Stuart Schechter).
71 See Bthme Market Comparison, supra note 74, at 303 (discussing the intricacies of a
hypothetical exploit derivatives market).
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related to a particular product. 76 Bug challenges suffer several key flaws. 77
First, there is no central clearinghouse that identifies upcoming challenges
and thereby increases hacker participation. Second, vendors use contracts to
withhold information about vulnerabilities, which in turn allows them not to
fix those vulnerabilities. Third, there are no effective metrics by which to
measure security levels. The greatest problem with bug challenges,
however, involves price-setting difficulties: The prize offered to hackers
may not necessarily equate with the value of the vulnerabilities
discovered.7 8 As such, bug challenges generally fail to enhance system
security, not only because vendors can exploit non-disclosure agreements to
maintain secrecy, but also because vendors fail to provide sufficient
monetary incentives to motivate the discovery of truly valuable
vulnerabilities. 79 Moreover, "it is still questionable whether the rewards can
ever be high enough to secure the accumulated assets at risk for software
with large installation bases in critical environments, such as finance, health
care, or governmental use." 80 Bug challenges may also fail because hackers
can sell vulnerabilities on the black market for a much higher price,
depending upon the value of the exploit and the ability of the hacker to
identify a willing buyer.8' In other words, bug challenges do little to expose
vulnerabilities because the challenges themselves entail significant
transaction costs, provide inadequate incentives, and allow continued
secrecy for the producer.
B. VULNERABILITY BROKERS
Markets based upon vulnerability brokers pose even greater
challenges. Actors in this category are private companies, like Symantec,
that pay for information concerning vulnerabilities and then sell that
information to customers through subscription services.8 2 These services are
generally purchased by system vendors, large network owners, the general
public, and maybe even hackers.83 Given the inclusion of hackers in these
markets, immediate disclosure of a vulnerability by a broker to its
customers may cause accelerated exploitation.84 In addition, some consider
the activities of vulnerability brokers a form of blackmail in that failure to
subscribe to the service results in missing important information.
8 5
76 Stuart E. Schechter, Computer Security & Risk: A Quantitative Approach 56-60
(May 2004) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University), available at
http://www.eecs.harvard.edu/-stuart/papers/thesis.pdf.
77 Id. at 57-60.
78 Bohme Market Comparison, supra note 74, at 302 (briefly noting these flaws).
79 See Radianti & Gonzalez, supra note 73, at 6.
80 Bbhme Market Comparison, supra note 74, at 302.
81 See Radianti & Gonzalez, supra note 73, at 11.
82 Camp, supra note 19, at 193-94 (discussing purchase of vulnerabilities by security
service vendors).
83 Bohme Market Comparison, supra note 74, at 302.
84 Schechter, supra note 76, at 88.
85 Bbhme Market Comparison, supra note 74, at 303.
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Vulnerability brokers develop a perverse incentive, in that "[a] vendor who
purchases vulnerabilities for its own subscribers or participants has no
reason to maintain the confidentiality of the vulnerability. Once protected,
the individuals who pay for the vulnerability have an incentive to leak
information to illustrate the value of their service."86 Given that US-CERT
tends to outperform commercial bug brokers, it would seem that the days of
such brokers are numbered. 7 Even with US-CERT, however, the bounty
placed on vulnerabilities does not equate with the value a hacker could
realize through illegal means, and US-CERT's confidentiality policy still
fails to overcome the transaction costs posed by "security through
obscurity" because the entity relies upon self-reporting.88 For these reasons,
both public and private vulnerability brokers fail as viable models.
C. CYBER INSURANCE
Cyber insurance represents a partial solution to vulnerability
management, albeit with several problems.89 Though Lloyds of London
began selling cyber insurance in 2003, the U.S. market remains
undersupplied, in part because providers must develop novel methodologies
for security audits, but also because global vulnerabilities can crop up at any
time, and because measuring the security of a system presents an almost
impossible task.9° Moreover, the Internet, the legal system, and problems
with international jurisdiction oftentimes leave providers with no way to
recoup compensation from offending parties. 91 For these reasons and more,
exploit derivatives emerge as the best mechanism for eliminating the
externalities posed by vulnerabilities.
86 Camp, supra note 19, at 194 (citations omitted).
87 Karthik Kannan & Rahul Telang, An Economic Analysis of Market for Software
Vulnerabilities 12 (Third Workshop on Econ. & Info. Security, 2004),
http://www.dtc.umn.edu/weis2004/kannan-telang.pdf (noting that "[w]hen users
voluntarily provide vulnerability information, the market-based mechanism does not
perform as well as the CERT-type mechanism even when it is regulated").
88 See Bohme Market Comparison, supra note 74, at 303 ("[CERT] does not pay any
reward for reporting vulnerability information .... ).
89 See id. at 305-06 (discussing the inconsistency between the fundamental principles of
insurance and the concentration of risk present in information security).
90 See, e.g., Rainer Bohme, Cyber-Insurance Revisited (Info. Security Econ. Workshop,
2005), http://www.infosecon.net/workshop/pdf/15.pdf (asserting that "the typical market
structure in IT businesses may thwart the formation of a proper insurance market for cyber-
risks"); Ozment, supra note 74, at 1. But see Bruce Schneier, Computer Security: It's the
Economics, Stupid 2 (2002), http://www2.sims.berkeley.edu/resources/affiliates/
workshops/econsecurity/econws/18.doc (describing a model for evaluating security risks).
91 Bohme Market Comparison, supra note 74, at 305-06; Hal R. Varian, Managing
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D. EXPLOIT DERIVATIVES
As the footnotes in this article no doubt indicate, Rainer Bihme
leads the scholarship on exploit derivatives. Bhme's contributions extend
the idea of binary options to vulnerabilities, using contracts that pay out
on specific dates if specific security events occur. 93 Building upon the work
of Kanta Matsuura,94 Bihme imagines markets, which I call "Rainer
markets," that work as follows. Assume a trading platform where xarties
can purchase contracts that pay if certain vulnerabilities occur. One
contract (a "vulnerability contract") pays $100 if a specific vulnerability in
a particular software product arises by a predetermined date, and an inverse
contract (a "security contract") pays out $100 if that same vulnerability does
not arise by that particular date. 6 As in futures markets like the Chicago
Climate Exchange,9 7 market makers dole out the contracts and profit from
fees, and a trusted third party ("TTP") confirms whether triggering events
take place.98 During trading, however, the market prices of the vulnerability
contracts approximate the likelihood of vulnerabilities arising, allowing
market participants to hedge, and providing an indicator of the security of
the underlying products.
99
Under B6hme's formulation, an efficient Rainer market reduces the
transaction costs involved in other markets by providing sufficient monetary
92 As described on Wikipedia:
A binary option is a type of option where the payoff is either some fixed
amount of some asset or nothing at all. The two main types of binary
options are the cash-or-nothing binary option and the asset-or-nothing
binary option. The cash-or-nothing binary option pays some fixed
amount of cash if the option expires in-the-money while the asset-or-
nothing pays the value of the underlying security. Thus, the options are
binary in nature because there are only two possible outcomes. They are
also called all or nothing options or digital options. For example,
suppose I buy a binary cash-or-nothing call option on XYZ Corp's stock
struck at $100 with a binary payoff of $1000. Then if at the future
maturity date, the stock is trading at or above $100, 1 receive $1000. If
its stock is trading below $100, 1 receive nothing.
Wikipedia, Binary Option, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Binary options (last visited Nov.
27, 2006).
9' Bohme Market Comparison, supra note 74, at 303.
94 See, e.g., Kanta Matsuura, Security Token and its Derivative in Discrete-Time
Models (2001) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://kmlab.iis.u-tokyo.ac.jp/
publications/2001 d/Matsuura SC1200I.pdf (describing a derivatives market for digital
security).
95 Bohme Market Comparison, supra note 74, at 303.
96 id.
97 Chicago Climate Exchange, Welcome to the Chicago Climate Exchange,
http://www.chicagoclimatex.com (last visited Dec. 3, 2006).
98 See Bt6hmie Market Comparison, supra note 74, at 304.
99 Id. at 303 ("[T]he ratio of the market price of C and its face value approximately
indicates the probability of software X being compromised before date D.").
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incentives and risk-balancing opportunities. 100  Moreover, by trading
derivative instruments, the market eliminates much of the imperfect
information that generally clouds existing vulnerability markets, instead
indicating security in a manner akin to how the Iowa Electronic Markets
operate to predict political contests-aggregating the knowledge and
incentives of people with money at stake to predict outcomes.
10 1
Nevertheless, B6hme's proposal leaves several problems unresolved,
secrecy chief among them.0 2
Understandably, Bihme's market aims to reduce transaction
costs. 10 3 But reducing transaction costs requires defining the parameters of
the good so that the resources necessary to transfer, establish, and maintain
property rights can arise. 10 4 Efforts to develop vulnerability taxonomies
often fail, however, which does not bode well for the creation of a Rainer
market. 105 Such failures seem odd, given that both the Common Criteria and
the military's purchase of vulnerabilities for use in warfare suggest that
some system of classification is at work for CNA and CND.I0 6 Indeed, the
market for Internet-enabled CNE dates as far back as 1986, when Berkeley
astrophysicist Cliff Stoll uncovered a spy ring culling trade secrets from
vulnerable computers connected with the Internet's precursor, ARPANet,
and selling them to the KGB. 107 Incorporating recent guidance from the
academy could exacerbate the instrument design challenge, however, in that
too much specificity might undermine liquidity.
108
Using too specific of an instrument would undermine formation of
the market because commodities exchanges make fees "by designing
100 See id. 306-08.
101 Stanley W. Angrist, Iowa Market Takes Stock of Presidential Candidates, WALL ST.
J., Aug. 28, 1995, available at http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/iem/wsj/wsj.html; Guessing
Games, EcONOMIST, Nov. 18, 2004, at 96; see, e.g., Robert W. Hahn & Paul C. Tetlock,
Using Information Markets to Improve Public Decision-making, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 213 (2005) (discussing design and implementation of markets to make effective use
of diffuse information to improve public policy).
102 See Bohme Market Comparison, supra note 74, at 309.
103 Id. at 303.
104 See Zerbe & McCurdy, supra note 15, at 11.
105 Matt Bishop & David Bailey, A Critical Analysis of Vulnerability Taxonomies 2
(U.C. Davis Dep't of Comp. Sci. Technical Paper, CSE-96-11, Sept. 1996)
http://www.cs.ucdavis.edu/research/tech-reports/1996/CSE-96-11.pdf (noting failure to
"define classification schemes that identify a unique category for each vulnerability").
106 ANDERSON, supra note 51, at 340; see also supra Section .C (describing computer
network enabling operations ("CNE"), computer network attacks ("CNA"), and computer
network defense ("CND")).
107 See generally CLIFFORD STOLL, THE CUCKOO'S EGG (2005) (providing an
autobiographical narrative of a computer security expert).
10' See Bthme Market Comparison, supra note 74, at 303; Yves Younan et al., Code
Injection in C and C++: A Survey of Vulnerabilities and Countermeasures 58-67
(Katholieke Universiteit Leuven Dep't Comp. Sci. Rpt. No. CW 386, July 2004)
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contracts that induce agents to reverse the directions of their trades."'
10 9
Indeed, the success of any derivative instrument hinges upon "cash market
size, risk-reduction ability of the [instrument], cash price variability, and
liquidity costs." 110  Above all, however, "futures contracts whose
specifications closely reflect the needs of hedgers seem more likely to
succeed."'11 As such, an exploit derivatives exchange must not only balance
the design of the contracts with the economic interests of the exchange
members, but also must consider vendor resistance to public disclosure, and
a need for technical detail that facilitates patching. Bihme, however, largely
ignores those considerations.
Guidelines from the National Institute for Standards and Technology
("NIST") may provide the answer that Bdhme does not.112 US-CERT uses
the NIST guidance in question to categorize security incidents for a
quarterly report, and adds two more incident types. In sum, they list as
incident types unauthorized access, denial of service, malicious code,
improper usage, scans/probes/attempted access, and investigation. 113 One
can therefore imagine, US-CERT creating a modified Rainer market that
trades a vulnerability contract paying $100 if the percentage of successful
denial of service attacks on routers running Cisco's Infrastructure Operating
System exceeds one percent of all reported incidents occurring between
109 Darrell Duffie & Matthew 0. Jackson, Optimal Innovation of Futures Contracts, 2
R. FIN. STUD. 275, 276-77 (1989) (noting that "[members of a futures exchange] prefer a
futures contract choice that maximizes the volume of trade").
110 B. Wade Brorsen & N'Zue F. Fofana, Success and Failure of Agricultural Futures
Contracts,19 J. AGRIBUSINESS 129 (2001) (citing D.G. BLACK, SUCCESS AND FAILURE OF
FUTURES CONTRACTS: THEORY AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE (1986)).
I Joost M.E. Pennings & Raymond M. Leuthold, Introducing New Futures Contracts:
Reinforcement Versus Cannibalism, 20 J. INT'L MONEY & FIN. 659, 660 (2001).112 NAT'L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., COMPUTER SECURITY INCIDENT HANDLING
GUIDE 37 (2004), http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-61/sp800-61.pdf.
113 US-CERT defines each category as follows: unauthorized access encompasses
incidents where "an individual gains logical or physical access without permission to a
federal agency network, system, application, data, or other resource"; denial of service
refers to "an attack that successfully prevents or impairs the normal authorized
functionality of networks, systems or applications by exhausting resources. This activity
includes being the victim or participating in the DoS"; malicious code refers to
"[s]uccessful installation of malicious software (e.g., virus, worm, spyware, bot, Trojan
horse, or other code-based malicious entity that infects or affects an operating system or
application. Agencies are NOT required to report malicious logic that has been successfully
quarantined by antivirus (AV) software"; improper usage encompasses when "[a] person
violates acceptable computing use policies"; scans/probes/attempted access covers "[a]ny
activity that seeks to access or identify a federal agency computer, open ports, protocols,
service, or any combination for later exploit. This activity does not directly result in a
compromise or denial of service"; and investigation refers to "[u]nconfirmed incidents of
potentially malicious or anomalous activity deemed by the reporting entity to warrant
further review." U.S. COMPUTER EMERGENCY READINESS TEAM, QUARTERLY TRENDS AND
ANALYSIS REPORT 2 (2006), http://www.us-cert.gov/press room/
trendsandanalysisQ406.pdf.
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January and March of 2007.114 Such a market would benefit from the
observed accuracy of US-CERT reporting without the inefficiencies of
delayed testing.
But the question of motivating participation remains. B61hme
suggests that a Rainer market will attract cyber security stakeholders with
profits and hedging opportunities. 116 He believes that hackers will
participate to capitalize on their own investigations and knowledge, such
that the contract prices will incorporate perfect information. 117 He also
suggests that software producers and cyber insurers will participate to hedge
risk, limit monitoring costs, and signal confidence in their own products.
To be sure, allowing vendors to participate in a market predicated on their
own failures could involve certain conflicts of interest. 119 1 submit,
however, that the sheer number of potential vulnerabilities and rules
outlawing insider trading will serve to limit market manipulation.
120
Even so, neither B61hme's market nor a US-CERT-managed market
will attract participation. The key impediment to either construct lies in
disclosures by the TTP.12 1 To be sure, one could partially obviate the
challenge by delaying contract execution past the point of verification and
disclosure in order to allow vendors time to develop and distribute
patches. 122 The final value of the vulnerability contract, combined with a
limited grace period in which the vendor could develop or buy a patch,
would even align vendor efforts with patching the most destructive
vulnerabilities.12  The market could not set too long of a grace period,
114 Indeed, US-CERT already collects and reports the required data. See U.S. Computer
Emergency Readiness Team, Incident Reporting System, https://forms.us-cert.gov/report/
(last visited Dec. 2, 2006).
115 Cf Kannan & Telang, supra note 87, at 9 (noting that "an unregulated market-based
mechanism will be better than the CERT-type mechanism only for a small parameter
region").
n6 B~hme Market Comparison, supra note 74, at 303-04.
1 1 7 
Id. at 304.
u'Id. at 303-04.
119 Bohme, supra note 16, at 5.
120 See United States Securities and Exchange Commission, Insider Trading,
http://www.sec.gov/answers/insider.htm (last visited Dec. 2, 2006). On the other hand, the
proposed market might actually benefit from insider trading. Cf STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE,
SECURITIES LAW: INSIDER TRADING 127 (1999) (citing HENRY MANNE, INSIDER TRADING
AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966)).
121 Notably, Bohme explicitly avoids the issue of public disclosure. See Bthme, Market
Comparison, supra note 74, at 309 ("As to future research, there remains to be written
chapters ... on the consequences for disclosure policies.").
122 See William Jackson, Vendors Battle Over Airing Software Flaws, GOV'T
COMPUTER NEWS, Dec. 16, 2002, available at http://www.gcn.com/print/21 34/20634-
I.html?topic-security (noting how former cyber security advisor Richard Clarke
simultaneously called for open disclosure of vulnerabilities while noting that vendors
needed time to develop patches).
123 Dmitri Nizovtsev & Marie Thursby, Economic Analysis of Incentives to Disclose
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however, as delayed contract executions would undermine liquidity. 24
Regardless of the grace period, however, neither market could emerge in the
present environment due to the fact that international, federal, and state law
protect the secrecy of vulnerabilities.
III. EXISTING LAWS INHIBIT VULNERABILITY MARKETS
For either form of exploit derivative market to emerge, the United
States must either roll back regulation that allows commercial software
vendors to hide vulnerabilities or provide some other form of incentive for
the vendors to participate. Notably, under existing laws,
[E]ach stakeholder involved in vulnerability disclosure may adopt
a differing view regarding the scope and type of role they are
willing take [sic]. Such decisions are often predicated on the
individual stakeholder's assessment of the perceived risk to them
of incurring financial or other liabilities or reputational injury, or
of potentially violating federal or state law. The legal landscape is
further complicated by the global nature of vulnerability reporting
against a backdrop of conflicting domestic and foreign laws and
regulations. Clearly, such variations in both domestic and foreign
laws provide an inconsistent foundation from which to manage
vulnerability communications and disclosures.
125
Any exchange adopting either a pure Rainer market or the modified
construct outlined above could likewise face liability under federal, state,
and international 126 law including the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
("DMCA"), the Graham-Leach Bliley Act, the USA PATRIOT Act of
2001, the Homeland Security Act, and the Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act. 127 Indeed, federal law requires that DHS withhold information
approaching the granularity of the proposed contract and exempts DHS
from disclosing that information under the Freedom of Information Act.
128
124 See Ashish Arora et al., How Quickly Do they Patch? 18 (Info. Security Econ.
Workshop, 2005), http://infosecon.net/workshop/pdf/41.pdf (noting that extended grace
periods correlate with vendors taking additional time to develop a patch).12 5 NAT'L INFRASTRUCTURE ADVISORY COUNCIL, VULNERABILITY DISCLOSURE
FRAMEWORK: FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE COUNCIL 9 (2004),
available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/vdwgreport.pdf (emphasis removed)
[hereinafter NIAC REPORT].
126 E.g., Parliament and Council Directive 2004/48, art. 95, 2004 O.J. (L 157) 32-36
(EC), available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2004/1 195/
1 19520040602en00160025.pdf (providing for sanctions for violations of intellectual
property law which might be triggered by certain types of information exchange).
127 See NIAC REPORT, supra note 125, at 38 (noting that possible penalties for
conducting security research and transmitting results to stakeholders are a barrier to
resolving software vulnerabilities). An exchange could also face third party liability under
the same laws.
128 Critical Infrastructures Information Act of 2002 § 214(b), 6 U.S.C. § 133 (2006).
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Similarly, a vendor could (and likely would) 129 prevent a TTP from testing
and reporting specific vulnerabilities using intellectual property laws. 130 As
such, these laws and others would impede vulnerability disclosures and the
emergence of an exploit derivatives market.
To understand the impediments, suppose that a security engineer
employed by the Directorate for Information Analysis and Infrastructure
Protection at DHS downloads an encrypted copy of the source code 131 for
Cisco's Infrastructure Operation System, 13
2 and cracks the encryption. 133
The engineer reviews the code and discovers a bug that will allow a
malicious hacker to shut down most of the Internet. 134 Moreover, the
security engineer knows that a theft of the very same source code from
Cisco several weeks earlier will likely expose the same vulnerability to a
more malicious party, that Cisco only updates its software every six months,
and that exposing the vulnerability herself will force Cisco to patch the
vulnerability in a far shorter time period. 3 5 If the security engineer tries to
disclose the vulnerability, however, Cisco can prevent her from doing so.
136
Indeed, if Cisco itself knows of the vulnerability and reports the flaw to the
129 C f Security Fix, http://blog.washingtonpost.com/securityfix/2007/02/
legal threat silences rfid sec.html (Feb. 27, 2007, 4:43 PM ET) (describing how HID
Global threatened security researchers from IOActive with a patent infringement lawsuit in
order to prevent the disclosure of vulnerabilities in radio frequency identification cards at
the 2007 Black Hat Federal security conference); Freedom to Tinker, http://www.freedom-
to-tinker.com/?p 880 (Aug. 4, 2005) (noting efforts by router manufacturer Cisco to
prevent disclosure of a bug in the Cisco Infrastructure Operating System using trade secret
laws.); see also Letter from HID Global Corporation to IOActive (Feb. 21, 2007), available
at http://www.aclunc.org/news/press releases/asset upload file907 4581.pdf.
" 0 See Cobell v. Norton, 2001 WL 1555296, slip op. at 5-9 (D.D.C. 2001) (collecting
laws and rules governing the disclosure of protected information contained in government
systems, including statutes and executive orders); see also INFO. INFRASTRUCTURE TASK
FORCE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE 175
(1995), http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/doc/ipnii/ipnii.pdf.
131 Wikipedia.com, Source Code, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sourcecode (last visited
Dec. 1, 2006) ("A computer program's source code is the collection of files that can be
converted from human-readable form to an equivalent computer-executable form. The
source code is either converted into an executable file by a compiler for a particular
computer architecture, or executed on the fly from the human readable form with the aid of
an interpreter.") (emphasis omitted).
132 See generally Cisco Sys., Cisco IOS Technologies, http://www.cisco.com/en/US/
products/ps6537/products ios sub category home.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2006).
133 See Kim Zetter, Cisco Security Hole a Whopper, WIRED, July 27, 2005, available at
http://www.wired.com/news/privacy/0,1848,68328,00.html.
134 id.
135 Id.; see also Anderson, supra note 35, at 128 (noting that "[o]pening a system
enables an attacker to discover vulnerabilities more quickly, but it helps the defenders
exactly as much.").
136 See Anderson, supra note 35, at 127 (noting how, under similar circumstances,
"Citibank obtained an injunction prohibiting any reporting of security vulnerabilities of
automatic teller machine systems disclosed by [Ross Anderson] and two colleagues at a
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DHS, DHS may not disclose the nature of the vulnerability under laws
designed to protect critical infrastructure. Instead, the legal environment
provides Cisco with a veil of secrecy that allows the company to prevent
both disclosure and discovery of the engineer's findings.
A. DMCA
As an initial matter, Cisco can rely upon the DMCA to prevent
discovery because the software engineer circumvented the encryption that
controlled access to the source code. 137 Cisco can prevent discovery of
vulnerability information because "[s]ource and object code (as well as the
nonliteral elements of program structure) are protectable as literary
works."' 138 To be sure, the DMCA permits some circumvention, but in all
likelihood the software engineer's actions will not fit within a safe harbor
that permits cracking encryption for the "sole purpose of identifying and
analyzing those elements of the program necessary to achieve
interoperability of an independently created computer program."'
139
Moreover, the security engineer may face civil or criminal consequences if
she ever publishes her means of decryption, since the DMCA trafficking
provision, using exceedingly vague language, operates to inhibit the
publication of "how to" manuals. 140 To qualify under the DMCA
"encryption research" safe harbor, the software engineer would have needed
prior permission from Cisco to decrypt the program, not to mention
adequate credentials indicating her qualifications as an encryption
researcher.' 4' Absent a relevant safe harbor, Cisco can bring a private right
of action against the engineer for violating the DMCA.
B. TRADE SECRETS
The savvy computer professional will note that most software
producers, including Cisco, offer only closed-source code with their
products. But even if the software engineer reverse-engineers the operating
system to find the flaw rather than cracking the encryption, Cisco can still
prevent discovery of the vulnerability under trade secret law 142 depending
137 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1) (2006).
138 ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL
AGE 904 (3d ed. 2003).
"9 § 1201(f)(1).
140 Cassandra Imfeld, Playing Fair with Fair Use? The Digital Millennium Copyright
Act's Impact on Encryption Researchers and Academicians, 8 CoMM. L. & POL'Y 111
(2003), available at http://www.leaonline.com/doi/abs/10.1207/S 15326926CLP0801 03.
141 Id at 127-28.
142 "[T]he term 'trade secret' means all forms and types of financial, business,
scientific, technical, economic, or engineering information, including ... programs, or
codes, whether tangible or intangible, and whether or how stored, compiled, or
memorialized physically, electronically, graphically, photographically, or in writing if
22
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upon the extent of the measures taken by Cisco to guard the secrecy of the
vulnerability. 143 Indeed, if the licensing agreement governing use of the
operating system includes a provision that prohibits reverse-engineering, in
certain jurisdictions the security engineer may even lose statutory
protections for the privilege to reverse engineer. 144 Moreover, so long as
Cisco can prove that the security engineer "improperly received the
information in question in such a manner that its confidential nature should
have been know to [the security engineer] and that [the security engineer]
nonetheless proposes to misuse such information," Cisco might receive an
injunction under state law. 145 Under federal law, Cisco can even threaten to
bring criminal charges against the security engineer, which could lead to
imprisonment or a $10 million fine if information about the vulnerability
ends up in the hands of a foreign government. 146 One might argue that using
trade secret protection to inhibit reverse engineering would never succeed in
court. However, Cisco used trade secret protection in 2005 to lever an out-
of-court settlement that prevented disclosure of a potentially fatal
vulnerability. 1
47
C. FEDERAL CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE STATUTES
Other rules and regulations, particularly those designed to protect
critical infrastructure, likewise prevent public disclosure of vulnerabilities
or personal information. 14 As noted above, section 1016(e) of the USA
PATRIOT Act of 2001 explicitly protects "critical infrastructure," a term
that includes "systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the
(A) the owner thereof has taken reasonable measures to keep such information secret; and
(B) the information derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not
being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable through proper means by, the
public." 18 U.S.C. § 1839 (2006). See also Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support
Corp., 825 F. Supp. 340, 360 (D. Mass. 1993) (holding that "reverse engineering" software,
viewed in light of the software producers' efforts to maintain the confidentiality of that
software, constituted a trade secret violation).
143 See MERGES, supra note 138, at 30-31 (noting that the Uniform Trade Secrets Act,
amended in 1985, protects knowledge or information not generally known to the public if
the holder of the trade secret takes reasonable precautions to prevent disclosure and the
defendant wrongfully acquires the unknown information).
144 Id. at 71 (noting a split among courts on the question of whether one party can
prohibit another from reverse-engineering its programs); see generally Stephen Donovan,
Patent, Copyright and Trade Secret Protection for Software, IEEE POTENTIALS, Aug-Sept.
1994, at 24, available at http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/iell/45/7535/00310923.pdf.
145 Data Gen. Corp. v. Digital Computer Controls, Inc., 297 A.2d 433, 435 (Del. Ch.
1971).
146 Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 1831 (2006).
147 Cisco Patches Security Researcher Vulnerability, GOOD MORNING SILICON VALLEY
(July 29, 2005, 10:39 AM), http://blogs.siliconvalley.com/gmsv/2005/07/
ciscopatchess.html; We Found the Body in a Server Closet, Wrapped Head to Toe in Cat
5 Cable, GOOD MORNING SILICON VALLEY (July 28, 2005, 1:24 PM),
http://blogs.siliconvalley.com/gmsv/2005/07/we found the bo.html.
148 Cobell v. Norton, 2001 WL 1555296, slip op. at 5-9 (D.D.C. 2001).
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United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets
would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security,
national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters.'
149
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7, in turn, requires that DHS and
other agencies "collaborate with private-sector entities in sharing
information and protecting critical infrastructure."' 150  The Homeland
Security Act of 2002 ("HSA") deliberately creates the opportunity to
protect the secrecy of information provided by private companies to
DHS.
151
The HSA also creates the possibility to protect the disclosure of
vulnerability information from the Federal Advisory Committee Act
("FACA") of 1972, which would otherwise require that communications
between Cisco and DHS occur in public meetings. 152 Because companies
like Cisco would have avoided such meetings for fear of public scrutiny,
153
the HSA protects "voluntary" disclosures of concerning vulnerabilities in
critical infrastructure from public scrutiny and removes regulations
governing ex parte proceedings under the Administrative Procedures Act.1
54
The HSA even removes whistleblower protections for the security
engineer. 155 Under the Whistleblower Protection Act, the government may
not fire employees who expose information reasonably believed to evidence
a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety. 156 The HSA, on
the other hand, prevents employees of DHS from disclosing protected
critical infrastructure information without legal authorization, and provides
for fines, imprisonment, or termination. 157 As such, if the security engineer
revealed information about the vulnerability and Cisco had reported that
information to DHS, then the security engineer could face monetary
penalties, incarceration, or unemployment.
58
Accordingly, if either DHS (and potentially US-CERT, in a
partnership with DHS) or a private entity attempted to develop the proposed
market in the present environment, Cisco or any other provider of "critical
infrastructure" could rely upon the secrecy that surrounds vulnerability
disclosures to shut down the market. I submit, however, that a pilot program
focused on Internet protocol version six could serve as a catalyst for
reducing that secrecy, thereby allowing the proposed market to emerge.
149 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
15 0 ISABELLE ABELE-WIGERT & MYRIAM DUNN, 1 INTERNATIONAL CIIP HANDBOOK
2006, 312 (2006), http://www.crn.ethz.ch/publications/cm team/detail.cfm?id-16156.
151 Id. at 339-40.
152 Id. at 338 ("[S]ection 871 of the Homeland Security Act ... gives the secretary of
homeland security the authority to create FACA-exempt advisory panels.").
153 See id.
154GINA MARIE STEVENS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., HOMELAND SECURITY ACT OF
2002: CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE INFORMATION ACT 7 (2003), http://www.fas.org/sgp/
crs/RL31762.pdf.
155 Id. at 12-13.
156 Id.
157 Critical Infrastructures Information Act of 2002 § 214, 6 U.S.C. § 133 (2006).
58 STEVENS, supra note 154, at 13.
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IV. INTERNET PROTOCOL VERSION SIX AS A PILOT PROGRAM
To align the interests of both the military and civilian policymakers
focused on the role of vulnerabilities in national security, it might make
sense to limit the initial scope of the market to vulnerabilities arising from
IPv6 as the United States will continue to rely primarily upon Internet
protocol version four ("IPv4") for well into the foreseeable future. Indeed,
as a relatively recent technological development, IPv6 will in all likelihood
expose critical infrastructure to the vulnerabilities that typically arise from
new technologies. 159 As such, developing a market focused on the new
protocol could introduce public and private interests to the flaws of the
protocol without waiting for a vulnerability to arise and threaten national
security. Moreover, limiting the pilot program to IPv6 would provide some
synergies with American national security policy as it relates to the Pacific
Rim.
Despite the risk of vulnerabilities from IPv6, the People's Republic
of China recently announced plans to migrate at least twenty municipalities
to IPv6 in time for the Beijing Olympics in 2008. 16 The ultimate effect of
IPv6 on cyber security, however, remains unclear. 161 Some experts contend
that "if China moves to an IPv6 network while the United States is still
running IPv4, Internet traffic coming from China will be impossible to track
back to its source." '1 62 Others suggest that "using IPv6 networking could
result in decreased network security for a certain period during which
network operators become more familiar with the new protocol and hackers
identify flaws in initial IPv6 implementations."' 163 Since vulnerabilities in a
pure IPv4 environment already arise from failures in the market, as
demonstrated above, then using the PRC migration to IPv6 as a catalyst for
a pilot program could kill two birds with one stone and serve to limit
resistance to change.1
64
As a matter of national security, China remains top of mind. The
159 See supra Part 1.
16 0 See Chan Chi-Loong, China's IT gold, CMPNETASIA, Dec. 21, 2005 (on file with
author); Ingrid Marson, China Launches Largest IPv6 Network, CNET NEWS.COM (Dec.
29, 2004), http://news.com.com/2100-1025 3-5506914.html.
161 See, e.g., SEAN CONVERY & DARRIN MILLER, CIsco Sys., IPv6 AND IPv4 THREAT
COMPARISON AND BEST-PRACTICE EVALUATION V1.0 (2004), available at
http://seanconvery.com/v6-v4-threats.pdf; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, TECHNICAL
AND ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT OF INTERNET PROTOCOL VERSION 6 (lPv6) 27-44 (2006),
available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/ntiageneral/ipv6/final/ipv6final.pdf.
162 Ben Worthen, A New Weapon for Control and Intelligence?, CIO MAGAZINE, July
15, 2006, available at http://www.cio.com/archive/071506/china-sidebar l.html.
163 Brent Rowe & Michael Gallaher, Could IPv6 Improve Network Security? And, If So,
at What Cost?, 2 I/S: J.L. & POL'Y 231, 233 (2006).
164 See Camp & Wolfram, supra note 15, at 17 (stating that there are positive
externalities of network security).
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Pentagon identifies China as an emergent military "peer competitor."
165
Washington recently redefined its WWII-era security relationship with
Japan from a model of protection against Cold War aggression to a model
of remilitarizing Japan in order to counterbalance the emergence of China in
the Pacific Rim.'166 To be sure, some schools of thought suggest that Asia
will only remain peaceful and stable if Washington and Tokyo act to engage
and integrate Beijing into regional security policy-making. 67 Undeniably,
however, China poses a particular threat in the realm of what their People's
Liberation Army ("PLA") calls "information warfare," a term that
encompasses CNO.
168
Indeed, following Operation Desert Storm, the People's Republic of
China realigned the PLA around warfare focused, at least in part, on
CNO.69 Two senior PLA colonels illuminated the shift when they outlined
the following scenario in a military doctrine called Unrestricted Warfare:
[I]f the attacking side secretly musters large amounts of capital
without the enemy nation being aware of this at all and launches a
sneak attack against its financial markets, then after causing a
financial crisis, buries a computer virus and hacker detachment in
the opponent's computer system in advance, while at the same
time carrying out a network attack against the enemy so that the
civilian electricity network, traffic dispatching network, financial
transaction network, telephone communications network, and
mass media network are completely paralyzed, this will cause the
enemy nation to fall into social panic, street riots, and a political
crisis. There is finally the forceful bearing down by the army, and
military means are utilized in gradual stages until the enemy is
forced to sign a dishonorable peace treaty.
170
The PLA now includes units trained to wage the CNA envisioned by Qiao
and Wang to level the playing field in military conflicts with the United
165 DEP'T OF DEF., QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW REPORT 29 (2006), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/QDR20060203.pdf.
166 Wu Xinbo, The End of the Silver Lining: A Chinese View of the U.S.-Japanese
Alliance, 29 WASH. Q. 119, 120-22 (2005).
16 71 d at 128.
168 See TOSHI YOSHIHARA, CHINESE INFORMATION WARFARE: A PHANTOM MENACE OR
EMERGING THREAT? 1-2 (2001), available at http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/
pdffiles/PUB62.pdf.
169 Advanced Network Research Group, Chinese Information Warfare: An Overview
(Sept. 23, 2003), http://www.infowar-monitor.net/modules.php?op-modload
&name-Archive&file-index&req-viewarticle &artid-2 &page- 1.
170 QIAO LIANG & WANG XIANGSUI, UNRESTRICTED WARFARE 145-46 (FBIS trans.,
1999), available at http://www.c4i.org/unrestricted.pdf; see also C.A. "Bert" Fowler,
Asymmetric Warfare: A Primer, IEEE SPECTRUM ONLINE, Mar. 2006,
http://www.spectrum.ieee.org/print/3091 (describing principles of asymmetric warfare).
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States. Moreover, as mentioned above, experts have observed a
prolonged series of information operations since the publication of
Unrestricted Warfare, a series of attacks collectively dubbed "Titan Rain,"
that directly target government and commercial networks in the United
States. 172 Though the ultimate authority for Titan Rain remains unclear, and
even though a cyber attack on American infrastructure would likewise
disadvantage the PRC,173 authorities at least know that Titan Rain originates
in China and bears the signs of military influence. 
174
Despite the inherent difficulty of identifying the scope of and
authority for Titan Rain, 175 the present configuration of the PRC
telecommunications network at least allows the United States to trace CNO
to mainland China, albeit imperfectly. 176  Absent effective
countermeasures, 177 China's present use of IPv4 allows the United States to
identify packets originating in China using the limited number of IP
addresses assigned to the PRC. 78 Moreover, China Telecom and China
Netcom maintain a state-sponsored duopoly over fixed-line
telecommunications facilities in China, and nine state-licensed Internet
Access Providers operate over their facilities. 179 Only China Telecom,
171 OFFICE OF THE SEC'Y OF DEF., ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: MILITARY POWER OF
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 35 (2006), available at http://stinet.dtic.mil/dticrev/
PDFs/ADA449718.pdf.
172 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
173 WILSON, supra note 12, at 8.
174 LEWIS, supra note 11, at 2; Thornburgh, supra note 11.
175 See Jason Barkham, Information Warfare and International Law on the Use of
Force, 34 NYU J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 57, 58 (2001) (noting the difficulty of distinguishing
full-scale information operations and minor electronic incursions).
176 See Thomburgh, supra note 11. But see Gorman, supra note I I (noting that
differences between the NSA and the Pentagon placed a program designed to safeguard
government networks and secrets seven years behind schedule).
177 "To conceal their location, thereby forestalling an effective response, many attackers
forge, or 'spoof,' the IP source address of each packet they send." David Moore et al.,
Inferring Internet Denial-of-Service Activity, 24 ACM TRANSACTIONS ON COMP. SYS. 115,
118(2006).
178 See 2005 FBI COMPUTER CRIME SURVEY 9, available at
http://www.digitalriver.com/v2.0-img/operations/naievigi/site/media/pdf/FBIccs2005.pdf
(noting that almost 25 percent of cyber attacks during 2005 traced to China); Thornburgh,
supra note 11 (describing how one security expert traced a series of Titan Rain attacks to a
single router in Guangdong province); Worthen, supra note 162 ("[I]f China moves to an
IPv6 network while the United States is still running IPv4, Internet traffic coming from
China will be impossible to track back to its source.") (citing James Mulvenon, deputy
director of the Center for Intelligence Research and Analysis). IP addresses work
somewhat like a telephone number, in that each machine that connects with the public
Internet must possess an IP address. Due to a limited number of IP addresses, however,
China relies extensively upon network address translation ("NAT"), a technological
measure that allows several computers to share a single IP address. See generally, Marson,
supra note 160.
179 CHINA INTERNET NETWORK INFO. CTR., 17TH STATISTICAL SURVEY REPORT ON THE
INTERNET DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA 9 (2006), http://www.cnnic.net.cn/download/2006/
17threport-en.pdf; OPENNET INITIATIVE, INTERNET FILTERING IN CHINA IN 2004-2005: A
2006-2007
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however, can provide international Internet connectivity and
interconnection, due to a series of regulations promulgated by the Ministry
of Information Industries that confines international telecommunications to
a single, state-operated carrier for reasons of national security and "orderly
administration."'  In other words, China Telecom constitutes a bottleneck
for all international telecommunications with China.
Presumably, the National Security Agency ("NSA") relies upon this
bottleneck to provide an early warning system for computer network
attacks. 181 Indeed, we know that the NSA works with telecommunications
providers to secure access to network switches that act as borders to the
domestic telecommunications infrastructure. 182 Moreover, "[a]nalysts and
historians who follow the intelligence community have long said the
companies that operate submarine cables ... surreptitiously provide access
to the NSA."'8 3 Since the PRC exercises monopoly control over all
international internet telecommunications, 184 and because the United States
interconnects with China through high-capacity international links that act
somewhat like cattle chutes for packet-switched communications, it seems
COUNTRY STUDY 6 (2005), available at http://www.opennetinitiative.net/studies/china/
ONI China Country Study.pdf; lain Morris, China's Broadband Boom, TELECOMM.
MAG., Nov. 1, 2006, available at http://www.telecommagazine.com/Intermational/
article.asp?HH- ID-AR 2533 (noting that resulting change needed to accommodate new
users); see also Shu-Ching Jean Chen, China Telcos Seen Offering Mainland Issues,
FORBES.COM, Jan. 8, 2007, http://www.forbes.com/markets/2007/01/08/china-telecoms-
xinhua-markets-emerge-cxj c_0108markets 10.html; see generally Wikipedia,
Telecommunications Industry in China, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Telecommunications_
industry in China (last visited Nov. 20, 2006).
180 PETER LOVELOCK, CHINA: IP TELEPHONY AND THE INTERNET 6 (2001),
http://www.itu.int/osg/spu/ni/iptel/countries/china/china-iptel.doc; see also Revised
Provisional Regulations Governing the Management of Chinese Computer Information
Networks Connected to International Networks (promulgated by State Council Decree,
Feb. 1, 1996, effective Feb. 1, 1996, revised May 20, 1997), available at
http://www.lehmanlaw.com/resource-centre/laws-and-regulations/information-technology/
revised-provisional-regulations-governing-the-management-of-chinese-computer-
information-networks-connected-to-international-networks-I 997.htm 1. ("Computer
information networks conducting direct international networking shall use the international
access channels provided by the national public telecommunications networks of the
Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications.").
181 See NAT'L SECURITY AGENCY/CENT. SECURITY SERV., TRANSITION 2001, at 3-4
(2000), available at http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB24/nsa25.pdf
(describing a shift in NSA operations to a focus on Signals' Intelligence and Information
Assurance).
182 Eric Lichtblau & James Risen, Spy Agency Mined Vast Data Trove, Officials Report,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2005, at Al ("The switches are some of the main arteries for moving
voice and some Internet traffic into and out of the United States, and, with the globalization
of the telecommunications industry in recent years, many international-to-international
calls are also routed through such American switches.").
183 Declan McCullagh & Anne Broache, Some Companies Helped the NSA, but Which?
CNET NEWS.COM, Feb. 6, 2006, http://news.com.com/2100-1028 3-6035305.html.
184 See Philip Sohmen, Taming the Dragon: China's Efforts to Regulate the Internet, 1
STAN. J. OF E. ASIAN AFFAIRS 17, 20 (2001).
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eminently plausible that focused CNE and CND can occur in an IPv4
environment. 1
8 5
IPv6, however, could undermine those capabilities. As a technical
matter, IPv6 will provide two principal benefits-a larger address space and
(optional) protocol-layer security. With regards to addressing, "IPv6
includes a new, expanded IP address, part of which is the unique serial
number of each computer's network-connection hardware." 8 6 Some experts
suggest that the transition to a longer IP address could increase the amount
of time required for a port scan, thereby slowing intrusions.187 With regards
to protocol-layer security, however, IPv6 embeds authentication and
encryption at the IP layer, much like the use of IPsec in IPv4. l ss Indeed, one
flavor of IPv6 security encrypts both the contents of communications and
the IP addresses that allow those communications to occur. 18 9 As one expert
noted, however, encryption and authentication at the IP layer "has the
potential to stop some network attacks, and to be a useful component in
designing robust distributed systems, but it won't be a panacea."
9
Nevertheless, the proposed security benefits of IPv6 will not
materialize in the short term. 191 "One of the cleverest things about IPv6 is
its ability to work alongside IPv4. Streams of IPv6 traffic can be wrapped
up inside IPv4 packets, allowing computers that understand IPv6 to
communicate via intermediate links that do not." 192 "Because most security
185 See, e.g., Plaintiffs' Amended Notice of Motion and Motion for Preliminary
Injunction in Hepting v. AT&T Corp., No. C-06-00672-VRW, at 6 (filed Apr. 5, 2006),
available at http://www.eff.org/legal/cases/att/Pl-Redact.pdf (noting a National Security
Agency program designed to tap international telecommunications "passing through
junctions on U.S. territory"); FED. COMMC'NS COMM'N INTERNATIONAL BUREAU REPORT,
2004 SECTION 43.82 CIRCUIT STATUS DATA 34-35 (2005), available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs public/attachmatch/DOC-262890A I.pdf (detailing points of
international interconnection).
186 Stop Signs on the Web, ECONOMIST, Jan. 13, 2001, at 21.
187 See CONVERY & MILLER, supra note 161, at 5-6.
188 ANDERSON, supra note 51, at 378; CONVERY & MILLER, supra note 161, at 17-18.
189 See Wikipedia, lPsec, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IPSec (last visited Dec. 4, 2006)
(discussing how the Encapsulating Security Payload extension header "provides origin
authenticity, integrity, and confidentiality protection of a packet").
190 ANDERSON, supra note 51, at 378.
191 MICHAEL P. BRIG, SPAWAR Sys. CTR. CHARLESTON, PROJECTED IMPACTS OF THE
INTERNET PROTOCOL VERSION 6 (IPv6) ON THE USN AND USMC ENTERPRISE 14 (2002)
available at http://www.nav6tf.org/documents/IPv6lmpactReport.pdf ("Administrators of
existing IPv4 networks may be reluctant, at least initially, to embrace IPv6 just because it
represents addition [sic] work and security threats."); Rowe & Gallaher, supra note 163, at
238 ("in summary, it is likely that in the short term (i.e., the first three to five years of
significant IPv6 use) the user community will, at best, see no better security than what can
be realized in lPv4-only networks today"); Arrigo Triulzi, Intrusion Detection Systems and
IPv6 1 (Velikono~ni Kryptologie, 2003), http://www.alchemistowl.org/arrigo/Papers/
SP12003-IDS-and-IPv6.pdf (describing the benefits and detriments of migration to IPv6).
192 Upgrading the Internet, ECONOMIST, Mar. 24, 2001, at 32. Cf Wikipedia.com,
Teredo Tunneling, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Teredo tunneling (last visited Oct. 5, 2006)
(describing one lPv6 over lPv4 tunneling protocol known as Teredo tunneling and
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hardware appliances and host-based intrusion detection programs have not
been programmed to inspect IPv6 packets in depth, data can bypass most
network security.' 19 3 Some developers of particularly malicious software
called "bots" have even created exploits that rely upon vulnerabilities in
IPv6 despite the infancy of the standard. 194 As such, the present inability to
predict the ultimate effects of IPv6 could seemingly benefit from the
information uncovered by the proposed market if it is limited to IPv6-based
vulnerabilities.
The impending migration of the federal government to IPv6 may
provide additional incentives for regulatory reforms. While the private
sector will deploy IPv6 at a glacial pace, with only 30% of users likely to
employ IPv6 by 2012,195 the Office of Management and Budget claims that
the federal government will adopt IPv6 by 2008, though the actual directive
only requires that networks in federal agencies provide capabilities for
passing IPv6 traffic. 196 The Pentagon and the NSA, however, expect to fully
enable IPv6 and phase out IPv4 completely by 2008.197 The question
emerges, then, as to whether the United States should stay the course and
ignore the risk that IPv6 could give rise to additional vulnerabilities that
threaten national security.
A market based on IPv6, however, can limit the secrecy surrounding
vulnerabilities in IPv6 and thereby improve the protection of critical
infrastructure. Moreover, the Pentagon and the NSA would benefit from the
information provided, in that the market will allow both entities to better
protect IPv6 networks in those entities against CNO. The true beauty of the
concept, however, lies in the limited implementation of an exploit
derivatives market in a pilot program that allows the exchange to tweak
contracts and exchange rules in a manner that leads to efficient outcomes.
To be sure, the market would still require some measure of deregulation to
remove a sliver of the secrecy surrounding critical infrastructure
vulnerabilities, but the cost of leaving those regulations in place is readily
apparent by virtue of the continued plethora of cyber attacks and
asserting that this protocol should only be used as a temporary measure until native IPv6
connectivity is much more widely implemented).
193 Robert Lemos, Covert Channel Tool Hides Data in IPV6, SECURITY Focus (Aug.
11, 2006), http://www.securityfocus.com/news/ 11406.
194See, e.g., Scott Berinato, Attack of the Bots, WIRED, Nov. 2006, available at
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/14.11 /botnetpr.html ("It's as though car thieves had
lock picks for 2008-model cars today.").
195 Rowe & Gallaher, supra note 163, at 247-48.
196 See Memorandum from Karen S. Evans, Administrator, Office of E-Government
and Information Technology, Office of Management and Budget, to Chief Information
Officers 2 n.2 (Aug. 2, 2005), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/
memoranda/fy2005/m05-22.pdf; William Jackson, Rep. Davis Calls for a Federal
Transition to IPv6, GOV'T COMPUTER NEWS, May 24, 2005, available at
http://www.gcn.com/online/voll nol/35898-1.html; See William Jackson, U.S. Faces a
Yawning Gap over Enthusiasm for IPv6, GOV'T COMPUTER NEWS, July 25, 2005, available
at http://www.gcn.com/print/24 20/36457-1.html.
197 BRIG, supra note 191, at 2-3.
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information exposures that result from continued tension between secrecy in
the marketplace and secrecy in national security.
CONCLUSION
To be clear, the proposed pilot program should not allow private
companies to act like the NSA, tapping international telecommunications
and privatizing CNO in the hopes of better securing critical infrastructure.
Rather, the pilot would limit the level of secrecy surrounding IPv6
vulnerabilities in certain critical software programs so that vendors like
Cisco could not use the legal environment to avoid enhancing cyber
security. 198 Indeed, one can imagine Congress passing a statute that
explicitly removes trade secret, DMCA, and HSA confidentiality
protections in order to give life to the proposed market, or a statute that
forces providers of critical infrastructure to notify their customers when
security breaches occur.
While such a secrecy roll-back seems far-fetched, California passed
a statute in 2004 that requires companies to report thefts of personally
identifiable information and security breaches.' Since the enactment of
that law, Americans have learned of "dozens of security breaches . . .
involving millions of people's personal info[rmation]," and company stock
prices responded accordingly. o Congress appears poised to extend the
California legislation to the nation through a series of bills that "establish
breach notification requirements, delineate triggers for consumer notice, and
specify the level of risk of harm or injury that triggers notification.
'" 201
However, some of those bills include "exceptions to notification
requirements ... for national security and law enforcement purposes, with
notice to Congress when exceptions are made." 20 2 As such, it seems that
software companies may soon have an incentive to internalize the
externality and enhance national security (unless they can convince
Congress to perpetuate secrecy), and thereby internalize the prime
transaction cost that gives rise to vulnerabilities. At least with regards to
COTS software, however, the impure public good that is national security
may in fact depend upon removing such "security by obscurity."
198 See supra Part III.
199 Act of Sept. 25, 2002, ch. 915, 2002 Cal. SB 1386 (requiring disclosures of security
breaches concerning confidential information); see also DOUG MARKIEWICZ,
VIGILANTMINDS, STATE SECURITY BREACH LEGISLATION 13-14 app. c (2006),
http://www.vigilantminds.com/files/vigilantminds state security breach legislation white
paper.pdf (listing relevant state information).
200 David Lazarus, Data Theft Bill a Step Backward, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 6, 2005, at JI,
available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file-/c/a/2005/11/06/
BUGPOFJ17S1.DTL.
201 GINA MARIE STEVENS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., DATA SECURITY: FEDERAL
LEGISLATIVE APPROACHES 3 (2006), available at http://wwwc.house.gov/case/
crs reports/data% 20security.pdf.20 2 Id.
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